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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 12/01/2008 Accident number: 468 
Accident time: 06:30 Accident Date: 27/06/2007 
Where it occurred: 1.5 km from Kirgochak, 
Rudaki District 
Country: Tajikistan 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 04/07/2007 
ID original source: TM07:01 Name of source: TMAC 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: dry/dusty 
sandy 
Date record created: 12/01/2008 Date  last modified: 12/01/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east: E 068 29.101 Map north: N 38 13.505 
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate area marking (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
 
Accident report 
The report of this accident was made available immediately after it occurred. The substance 
of the BoI report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original files are held on 
record. The International demining NGO involved in the accident is referred to throughout as 
the “Demining group” because there was only one demining group operating in the country at 
the time. Text in [ ] is editorial change or comment. 
 
REPORT OF BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO DEMINING ACCIDENT AT KIRGOCHAK ON 27 
JUNE 2007 
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Dushanbe 04 July 2007 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A mine accident occurred approximately sixty kilometres south of Dushanbe, one-and-a-half 
kilometres from the village of Kirgochak, in Rudaki district, at approximately 06:30hrs on 
Wednesday 27th June 2007. 
One person was killed in the accident; twenty-two years of age [the Victim], from Rudaki 
district died shortly after two unplanned detonations of Russian manufactured PMN 
antipersonnel landmines within the area where he was working as a deminer for [Demining 
group], at a demining task site. After the accident he was immediately evacuated to the 
Russian Military Hospital in Dushanbe, but was dead on arrival. See Initial Report Of Mine 
Accident, at Annex A and Landmine Accident Information Bulletin at Annex B. 
A Board of Inquiry appointed by the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC) interviewed all 
team members, medic, section leaders and team leader as well as [Demining group] 
managers. The Board also inspected all equipment involved in the accident and visited the 
task site three times to assess the causes of the accident. See Terms of Reference for Board 
of Inquiry at Annex C. 
 
SEQUENCE, DOCUMENTATION AND PROCEDURES OF TASKING 
The task was selected after a tasking from TMAC to [Demining group] and a subsequent 
deployment by [Demining group] mine action teams from Dushanbe. [The Demining group] 
first arrived at this task site on 7th November 2006. The team’s work in the minefield actually 
started on 13th Nov 2006. After a break of some weeks due to poor weather conditions during 
the 2006-2007 winter season, the teams restarted works at the site on 23 May 2007. [The 
Demining group] teams have cleared some 1,500 square metres of land so far at this site and 
destroyed some 700 PMN anti-personnel mines there. One hundred and thirty Russian 
manufactured PMN antipersonnel mines had been destroyed by explosive demolition on the 
site on the day before the accident. 
Works on the site were regulated by [Demining group]’s Implementation Plan, TS IS #425, 
which provides methodology and a schematic illustration of a clearance method, but which 
does not mention clearing up debris and fragmentation or re-marking of areas after demolition 
shots in the minefield.  
Wednesday 27 June was a national holiday, but exactly who instructed the team to work on 
this day remains unclear. [Demining group] HQ Dushanbe is unable to state who gave the 
instruction and personnel in the field can state nothing more accurate than ‘the order was 
given by HQ’. Some of the deminers at work on that day said they worked the same as they 
worked every other day and some, including the Team Leader, stated that they had been 
instructed to check cleared area and collect fragmentation and debris caused by the 
demolition of mines on the area on Tuesday 26 June. 
 
GEOGRAPHY 
The accident occurred near to the village of Kirgochak in the Rudaki District, approximately 60 
kilometres south of Dushanbe, at a Tajik Border Force ammunition storage depot, close to the 
headquarters of the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division. Lat/Lon N 38 13.505 E 068 29.101 
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Elevation is approximately 981 metres above sea level. See maps and satellite images of site 
and general area at Annex D. [These large files have been removed.] 
The general area where the accident occurred is grassy pastureland, wheat fields and rolling 
hills. The point of detonation was on an area of ground on a slight incline, within a row of 
mines inside the working area of a deminer involved in the clearance of the ground as part of 
his normal duties at that location. 
 
Accident site, [showing marking placed after the accident.] 
Soil in this region is mostly sandy loam or clay, with few stones or other schist. 
An unsurfaced track/road onto the area is an extension of a metalled road from the main 
Dushanbe-Kurghonteppa road and the task site is easily accessible along this road. 
Other than the garrison of the Russian Motor Rifle Division, (mostly unknown to [Demining 
group] or the Board of Inquiry), the nearest inhabited buildings are at the village of Kirgochak, 
approximately one-and-a-half kilometres away to the northwest from the accident site.  
Weather conditions at the site on the day of the accident and during the inquiry were dry, and 
hot (around 30° Celsius) and there had been no rain or cold weather during the preceding 
week. The ground was dry at the time of the accident and there had been no significant wind 
during the morning of the accident. 
[Other site pictures have been removed.] 
 
PRIORITY OF TASK 
The mines at Kirgochak were placed to protect a weapons storage site, and that "protection" 
is no longer required. The fencing protecting the minefield has aged and broken in places. 
The surrounding land is used by local people and there have been accidents involving 
livestock when they enter the mined area through holes in the fencing. There is a concomitant 
risk of people entering the area in pursuit of valuable livestock. Although a rural area, 
Kirgochak is at low altitude, close to populated areas and only an hour from the city of 
Dushanbe. 
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The priority of the minefield is "low", but its relatively low altitude and proximity to Dushanbe 
makes it possible to work there during the months before the weather in the mountains allows 
deminers to deploy to high altitude sites. For this reason, the site is worked on when there is 
spare capacity due to difficulty accessing higher priority sites.   
 
SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING 
The minefield is situated within a strip of ground, approximately ten metres wide and lined on 
each side by ten strands of barbed wire fence, suspended on angle-iron pickets, which are 
spaced at ten metre intervals around the minefield. It consists of three rows, each about two 
metres apart, of PMN antipersonnel landmines. Mines are spaced approximately 50cm to one 
metre apart, and the rows continue all around the entire perimeter of the ammunition storage 
depot. 
 
Perimeter Minefield Around an Ammunition Depot 
Although the minefield is well marked, it was noted during the Board of Inquiry’s investigations 
at the site, that the mine clearance site was not well marked. In particular, it was observed 
that insufficient marker pickets and marking tape had been deployed to show the line between 
cleared and uncleared areas. The area where [the Victim] was working was clearly the most 
potentially dangerous area on this part of the minefield, because he had a line of uncleared 
mines to his left, a line of craters created by recently destroyed mines to his right and a similar 
line behind him. In front of him there was a point where the line of craters stopped and 
continued as a line of uncleared, undiscovered mines. Despite this, there was no significant 
difference in marking here than at any other place on the minefield and marking to show 
where the line of cleared mines ended and where the uncleared area started was minimal.  
At the time of the Board of Inquiry’s investigation, two red marking pickets were emplaced into 
the ground next to the craters where the PMNs detonated. These two pickets are apparently 
undamaged by smoke or blast and there is some speculation that they may have been 
emplaced after the accident; it is very unlikely that they could have remained in place and 
undamaged during two close-proximity detonations. 
A short (0.5m long) marker picket, broken approximately in half, was found near the point of 
detonation. There were no visually apparent signs of smoke or blast damage to the picket and 
the break could not definitely be attributed to the PMN detonation which is the subject of this 
report. The red-painted top of the picket was found approximately nine metres from the point 
of detonation, the base part of the picket, which should normally be shaped or sharpened to a 
point, but in this case was neatly sawn at 90°, was found next to the barbed wire fence about 
three metres from the point of detonation. There were some faint markings around the break 
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on both parts of the picket to indicate that it had been broken by a stone. This might have 
occurred during an explosive blast, such as that caused by the detonation of a PMN mine. 
[Demining group] Deminers normally mark the start point of their day’s work by driving a short 
(0.5m length) picket, with a blue-painted top, into the ground. In the case of [the Victim], no 
such blue picket was found, either on site or amongst his toolkit, which was left close by the 
scene of the accident. 
There was confusion among the deminers about whether the day’s work was to be search 
and clearance of ground contaminated by landmines or simply collection of fragments and 
debris from areas already cleared.  Probably because of this confusion, some deminers used 
their blue peg to show where the day’s work had started, some did not. Some deminers used 
a base-stick on that day, some did not. 
The [Demining group] demining team at Kirghochak are living in a tented camp approximately 
seven hundred and fifty metres from the minefield. The team have set up their living area in a 
field camp with accommodation tents and two field kitchens. Although it is separated by a 
barbed wire fence and raised earthworks, the [Demining group] camp is located adjacent to 
the Border Force detachment which guards the ammunition depot. [Demining group] teams at 
this location are supported by [Demining group] with sufficient primary health care, shelter 
and food. Water is delivered on a daily basis by [Demining group] in containers and by the 
Border Force who refill the team’s static water tanks on a repayment basis. 
 
SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE ON SITE 
A planned visit by OSCE VIPs was expected on the site on this day and arrangements were 
being made to receive the delegation, which meant that the Team Leader was busy with 
preparations for the visit and so not available to be present on the demining work site that 
day. 
[Demining group] have a total of twenty-seven personnel working on this project task site and 
these are managed and monitored by Team Leader [Name removed]. 
A demining team site logbook was available to record visitors and routine daily events at the 
site. See Annex G for example pages [not included]. 
[Demining group] report that their managers routinely visit their teams and work sites on an 
occasional basis, usually more than once each week. This includes visits either by the 
expatriate Project Adviser, the local national Project Manager or the expatriate Operations 
Officer or his local national Operations Officer as well as oversight from expatriate EOD 
Technical Advisers. Recorded visits from [Demining group] senior managers and expatriate 
advisers to this task site prior to 27 June were as follows. 
• 04 June: [National] OPS officer 
• 04 June: [National] PM 
• 05 June: [National] Ops officer 
• 12 June: [National] Ops officer 
• 13 June: [1st International] EOD TA 
• 14 June: [International PM and] Project Adviser, [who wrote] Field visit – excellent, 
neat and safe work.  Congratulations to whole team. 
• 14 June: [National] Ops officer 
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• 20 June: [National] Ops officer 
• 22 June: [2nd International] EOD TA 
[Demining group]’s expatriate Project Adviser states that other visits were made by [Demining 
group] managers and advisers, but these are not recorded in the site log book. [Demining 
group] EOD Technical Adviser states that he was on the site almost every day, but this also is 
not recorded in the log book. [Demining group] also report that they do not have enough 
expatriate advisers to visit sites as often as they would prefer. [At the time there were five 
expatriates and three working areas.] 
No managers, advisers or senior supervisors were at the task site at the time of the accident. 
The most senior persons on site that day were two Section Leaders, one, who had been 
promoted only that day, was responsible for four deminers, and one was responsible for two 
deminers. 
 
QUALITY ASSURANCE 
On-site management, supervision and Quality Assurance (QA) of works at the task site are 
the responsibility of the [Demining group] Team Leader. In support of this on-site supervisor 
there is normally a formal regime of internal supervision and inspection for the work of all of 
[Demining group]’s Mine Action Teams. Their work is also regulated by UN International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS), Tajikistan National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) and the 
organisation’s own Standing Operational Procedures (SOP). 
As part of internal Quality Control (QC) procedures, the Supervisor, Team Leader or Section 
Leader at the task site is required to check each area cleared to ensure that no signals are 
received from a metal detector when it is passed over areas which have been cleared by a 
deminer. Such procedures should be recorded on specific Quality Control reporting forms, 
which should be part of the on site logbook. In the May and June Logbooks there are no 
pages for Quality Control, though [Demining group] stated that these would be provided 
separately by [Demining group] to the Board of Inquiry. At the time of writing, no QC reporting 
forms have been delivered. 
No quality control monitoring or checks had been made on the day of the accident. Despite 
the lack of formal records, [Demining group] state that routine Quality Control checks are 
made on a daily basis by the Team Leader and the Section Leaders at every task site, 
including at Kirgochak on every day of operations prior to the day of the accident. 
As well as [Demining group]’s internal Quality Control, TMAC normally inspects all task sites 
through the national Quality Assurance Officer. The most recent inspections by the TMAC QA 
Officer were on 6th and 15th June 2007. See TMAC QA Reports at Annex H [not included]. 
Internal Quality Reporting. [Demining group] provided a data stick and a quantity of paper 
reports in an [Demining group] envelope, delivered to the Board of Inquiry. Between these two 
sources there were five Reports of Demolitions of Landmines, and seven Daily Demining 
Reports. There was also one QA report on Medical Support and one QA report on Minefield 
Marking. As well as this, there were three TMAC QA reports, one of which is a QA evaluation 
of Training. There were no [Demining group] routine QA Reports in the envelope or on the 
data stick. 
  
COMMUNICATIONS 
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[Demining group]’s on-site communications network is based on handheld VHF radios for 
internal contact within the task site area and on mobile telephones and satellite telephone for 
external contact.  On site vehicles, normally parked at the camp site are equipped with 
CODAN High Frequency radios and are therefore able to communicate with [Demining 
group]’s Dushanbe office from Kirgochak camp site. 
Routine twice-daily reports are made to [Demining group]’s Dushanbe HQ office from the 
Kirgochak  task site by mobile telephone or Satellite telephone. 
On the day of the accident, Team Leader [Name removed] called the Russian Military 
Hospital at Dushanbe to inform that a casualty would soon be on the way to them.  
Routine twice-daily reports are made to [Demining group]’s Dushanbe HQ office from the 
Kirgochak  task site by mobile telephone. 
 
MEDICAL AND EMERGENCY SUPPORT 
All [Demining group] operations normally deploy with a qualified medic as part of the team; a 
comprehensive trauma and first aid pack and a fully equipped ambulance vehicle appropriate 
to demining operations is provided at every task site. All demining personnel receive twenty-
four hours of first aid instruction as part of basic deminer training and a further 16 hours as 
part of annual refresher training. Medical and emergency support provided to the team 
involved in this accident was adequate for the circumstances.  
The medic was routinely stationed away from her ambulance and normally under the shade of 
a tree near to the entrance of the ammunition storage depot which the minefield surrounds. 
The ambulance was inconveniently placed, outside the perimeter of the ammunition depot 
and about five hundred metres away from where the deminers were working. [Demining 
group] do not have permission from the Border Force to take vehicles into the ammunition 
storage depot on a routine basis. [Demining group] also state that the ambulance is parked at 
the same ‘Medical Point’ which was appointed when this task site was first opened, in 
November 2006, but it has not been moved in line with the progress of local demining 
operations. When the accident occurred, the ambulance was allowed to drive into the depot 
and the driver moved it as close as he could get to the accident site, a point about one 
hundred metres away from the point of detonation. See satellite image at Annex D. [Not 
included]  
National Mine Action Standards require that a casualty evacuation exercise should be carried 
out immediately on first arrival at any task site and routinely at least once each month. This 
task started on 23 May. The on-site log book records that exercises were carried out on 
Tuesday 22 and Saturday 26 May and on Saturdays 2, 9, 16 and 23 June. 
Immediate treatment. Medic and team members report that procedures and drills that were 
implemented to evacuate the casualty from the minefield to a safe area and then on to the 
Russian Military Hospital went well and in accordance with training received by them from 
[Demining group]. [Demining group]’s qualified, professional medical assistance was available 
to assist and treat [the Victim] within a few minutes immediately after the accident, before he 
was evacuated by [Demining group] ambulance towards the Russian Military Hospital in 
Dushanbe approximately ten minutes later. 
Among others, deminers [Deminer 1] and [Deminer 2] were working close to the victim and, 
after the mine detonated, arrived at the scene of the accident first. Section Leader [name 
removed] arrived immediately after. The casualty was then carried by fellow deminers to a 
point immediately outside the marked minefield barbed-wire perimeter, where the medic 
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arrived a few moments later, having run there from her post, approximately one hundred 
metres away, when she heard the initial explosion.  
[Demining group]’s on-site medic, [name removed], said in interview that although she was 
ready to administer immediate emergency treatment to [the Victim] she thought it most likely 
that [the Victim] was dead even before he was placed inside the ambulance, a few minutes 
after the detonation of the PMN mines. She examined [the Victim] as soon as he had been 
carried the few metres from the point of detonation to a safe area outside the minefield and 
remarked that she was unable to detect any pulse, his Blood Pressure was extremely low 
(40/0) and that he exhaled what appeared to be his final breath at that point. 
At 06:51 hours the casualty was removed from the area in the team’s ambulance vehicle, 
driven by [name removed], and taken to the Russian Military Hospital in Dushanbe, 
approximately sixty-five kilometres from the site. Immediately on arrival at the hospital, the 
ambulance carrying the victim, medic and team members was met by a doctor and hospital 
staff members but [the Victim] was pronounced dead on arrival. 
As a result of standing on one PMN mine and falling forward onto a second mine, [the Victim] 
was killed. A report from the Russian Military Hospital states that the casualty sustained the 
following injuries:  
Explosion trauma. Neck - injury of blood vessels and nerves in the throat and oesophagus. 
Serious bleeding. Open fracture of the lower left jaw. Closed fracture of the left shin. Large 
fracture and trauma of external and internal surfaces of left thigh, covering upper part of leg, 
up to testicles. Partial amputation of the left foot, open fragmentation fracture of the left foot, 
foot bones I-II-III. Fragmentation injuries in chest and stomach. See initial post mortem 
examination report. [See Medical report.] 
[An IMSMA report with its imprecise labelling has been removed.] 
There were no apparent injuries to the victim’s arms or to his head. Further autopsy reports 
may disagree with this statement, but such reports will not be available for at least one week 
after the publication of this report. 
 
PERSONALITIES INVOLVED 
[Demining group] expatriate management and advisory team in Dushanbe consists of four 
persons; 
     Programme Adviser/[manager] 
     Operations Manager 
     2 x EOD Technical Advisers 
National management team consists of: 
    Project Manager 
    Operations Officer 
Level of training and experience of supervisory and managerial staff. The expatriate 
Programme Adviser has experience from two-and-a-half years as a mine action manager with 
[Demining group] in Sudan, where he was employed initially as Survey Team Supervisor, 
then Operations Officer and then as Operations Manager. The EOD specialists are well 
qualified and experienced enough to be employed as Technical Advisers in any mine action 
programme. No CV was received from [Demining group] for the expatriate Operations Officer. 
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Both national managers have worked for [Demining group] Dushanbe for more than four 
years and are consequently very knowledgeable and experienced about the programme. 
National Project Manager [name removed] is qualified from an International Mine Action 
middle managers’ course in Bangkok, 2005. 
All team members are trained and qualified deminers and all are long-term, experienced 
employees of [Demining group]. All personnel have completed and passed at least one 
[Demining group] basic deminer training course. Deminers’ Job Description is shown at 
Annex J. [Not included.] The level of training and experience of the demining personnel 
involved in the incident was adequate. Last deminer refresher training, which was completed 
just prior to this team deploying to this work site, was from 07 May to 18 May 2007. Dates and 
subjects covered during last refresher training are shown at Annex K. [Not included.] 
Leave periods and days off work. The team personnel involved in the incident had been 
working at the area for one month and their last days of rest were from after duties on 
Monday 18 June to starting work on Monday 25 June (Team Leader worked during this 
period), and from 28 to 30 June. See attendance record at Annex L. [Scanned document not 
included] From January to May the team were at home, on standby during Tajikistan’s winter 
season, when no demining takes place. 
[The Victim]’s whereabouts on Thu 28, Fri 29, Sat 30 June are not recorded in the on site log 
book attendance sheet. [Demining group] report that he was on leave, together with the 
remainder of the team, at this time. 
 
EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS 
The deminer involved in this accident was deployed with a standard-issue [Demining group] 
deminer’s toolkit. The items mentioned below were found at the scene of the accident. 
Metal detector - An electronic metal detector is normally used by deminers to help locate 
metallic landmines which are buried in the ground. Judging from the position and condition of 
the instrument issued to [the Victim], which was left at the scene of the accident, it is clear 
that, although ready for deployment, this tool was not in immediate use at the time when the 
mines detonated. [The Victim] was not using his metal detector at the time of the accident. 
The detector was an Ebinger model 421GC, it was not damaged in either of the two 
detonations which occurred close by where it lay on the ground. When the detector was 
recovered from the scene of the accident and tested, it appeared to be 100% effective. It was 
found to be in good working order and on-site testing showed that the detector was capable of 
locating PMN anti-personnel mines to the required depth in the type of soil encountered at 
this task site. Ebinger metal detector was tested by [Name removed], QA Officer at TMAC. 
Trowel – A small hand trowel is normally issued to deminers as part of their standard toolkit, 
to assist with the excavation of earth when searching for landmines. Judging from the position 
and condition of the implement left behind at the scene of the accident, it is clear that [the 
Victim] was not using his hand trowel at the time of the accident. 
Hammer – A small hammer, normally used for driving wooden marker pickets into the 
ground. Although there are no blast or powder smoke marks on it to provide firm evidence of 
usage, [the Victim] may have been using his hammer, at the time of the first detonation. The 
hammer was found approximately nine metres in  front of where [the Victim] was working and 
it is possible that the tool was thrown there, perhaps torn from [the Victim]’s hand, by the blast 
effects which occurred during the detonation. 
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Base-stick - Base sticks are used by deminers to mark the boundary between the cleared 
and uncleared area during work at the forward edge of a minefield clearance lane. The rule is 
that the area behind the stick is safe (cleared of mines). The area in front of the stick is unsafe 
(not cleared of mines). A Base Stick is a 1.2-metre long, approximately 25mm X 25mm 
wooden rod. The middle one-metre part of the stick marks the correct lane width. It is unclear 
whether or not [the Victim] was using his base stick at the time of the accident. During the 
Board of Inquiry’s investigation of the accident site there was a base stick on the ground, 
between the two craters left by the PMN mines involved in this accident. Although it would 
normally be expected [to be marked or damaged] after being in such close proximity to two 
antipersonnel mine detonations, there was no smoke marking or blast damage to the base 
stick. There has been some speculation that this base-stick was placed on the area after the 
accident, in an attempt to demonstrate to the Board of Inquiry that it was being used prior to 
the accident. If this speculation is correct, this action is of course obviously entirely 
unacceptable and should the perpetrators be discovered, it is anticipated that disciplinary 
action will be taken against them. 
 
DETAILS OF MINE INVOLVED 
Bakelite, metal and rubber fragments recovered from one of the craters created by the blast 
of the explosions indicate that the mines involved were Russian PMN anti-personnel blast 
mines. The craters left by the detonations are as would be expected from such devices. For 
technical details on PMN antipersonnel mines, see Annex M. [Not included.] 
PMN anti-personnel mines are among the biggest and most powerful antipersonnel mines 
deployed anywhere in the world. A PMN is loaded with 240 grams of high explosive and a 9 
gram booster charge. It is designed to be operated by 8 to 25Kg of pressure from above.  
Analysis of the craters caused by the detonations shows that both of the mines involved in 
this accident were buried at a depth of approximately 12 centimetres in the ground and less 
than one metre apart. All PMN mines found by [Demining group] at Kirgochak so far have 
been buried at depths of less than 15 centimetres. Further evidence that mines at this task 
site are laid in shallow excavations may be deduced from the many uncleared mines which 
can be seen protruding from the surface of the ground. The mines were laid in the middle row 
of three rows. Mines were originally laid at this site by Russian armed forces in C1973 and the 
location was handed over to Tajikistan’s Border Force in 2005. 
 
Crater A [the crater he stepped in.] 
 
DRESS & PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
The Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) issued by [Demining group] to their deminers is 
manufactured by the ROFI company, of Norway http://www.rofi.com/. All personal protective 
equipment (PPE) at the site conformed to Paragraph 4 of UN International Mine Action 
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Standard 10.30, in that it was capable of protecting against the effects of an explosive blast 
as follows: 
Frontal protection. Appropriate to the activity, capable of protecting against the blast effects of 
240g of TNT at 30cm from the closest part of the body.  
Eye protection. Capable of retaining integrity against the blast effects of 240g of TNT at 60cm, 
providing full frontal coverage of face and throat as part of the specified frontal protection 
ensemble. Facial visors used by [Demining group] in Tajikistan are manufactured by Security 
Devices of Zimbabwe. http://www.secdevinc.com/  
Visor. [The Victim]’s visor is severely deformed, broken and damaged by heat and blast. See 
images at Annex N [not included]. Close inspection of the largest piece of visor recovered 
after the accident showed enough side edges to determine its orientation. It is the lower part 
of the visor with the top edge entirely removed. The polycarbonate material was heat 
distorted, rippled and bubbled. It had been extensively thinned by stretching (from an original 
thickness of 5mm to 2mm) and heated to well above its forming temperature (at least 180 
degrees Centigrade) throughout its thickness. A bottom corner had split and twisted inward, 
forming a sharp shard approximately 5cm long that pointed in towards the wearer's throat. 
The visor head-frame, made of ballistic aramid with a washable cover, had been shredded at 
the front. Visor damage is consistent with it receiving an extreme shattering force near the top 
centre and an extreme temperature for a microsecond. Fragments of the dark blue ballistic-
aramid material used in the manufacture of the visor’s head-frame were later found in the 
crater, (along with a small piece of burnt Bakelite, originally from the outer casing of the PMN 
mine and the remains of its striker-pin and spring).  
It seems probable that a mine was initiated by the wearer falling forward and striking the 
ground above a mine with the top part of the visor. The damage to the victim's throat is 
consistent with the sharp shard of visor on the lower edge being torn sideways as the visor 
was thrown away by the expanding blast wave. 
On inspecting the body armour, the damage was found to be concentrated on the left side, 
with panels torn away. This is consistent with the victim having stepped with his left foot on a 
mine while leaning forward. The front of the victim's left boot was missing and his shin (above 
if leaning forward) had been shattered. When reconstructing this position, the groin and 
genitals are directly above the seat of initiation and so inside the fragment cone associated 
with the detonation of a buried mine. The groin injuries are taken to confirm the victim's 
position.  
What is inconsistent with the left-side frontal damage to the armour apron is the fact that the 
apron straps were torn from the apron (breaking nylon stitching), plastic buckles had 
snapped, and the apron was thrown 12 metres from the victim's body. The inner armour panel 
of the throat protection was also thrown aside, although its Velcro-fastened cover was 
undamaged. In the absence of other explanations it seems likely that the straps were broken 
and the collar emptied by a blast from above that entered behind the armour and sought to 
expand between the body and the armour, forcing the armour to break at its weakest points. 
When it broke, pressure behind it had built to the point that the armour was thrown aside and 
landed a distance away. A blast from above the armour neck-hole is consistent with the visor 
damage. 
There is no obvious surface damage to the victim's head or torso (although light damage may 
not have shown in the photographs). If the head sustained the shock associated with the mine 
detonating closer than ten centimetres (even with 5mm polycarbonate in front of it), internal 
cranial damage and a broken neck might be anticipated. Whether or not these occurred, the 
11 
absence of obvious skin abrasions on the forehead make it probable that the visor fell off as 
the victim was pitched forward by the first blast and he landed with his face inside the visor 
but not inside the head-frame. The top of the visor and head frame were then shattered and 
torn by the blast which lifted the victim's body, with blast entering between the top of the body 
armour and his torso, expanding to break the armour sharply away. At the same time the 
remains of the visor were thrown aside by the expanding blast wave, with the sharp inward 
shard slicing through the victim's throat. The victim fell back to rest with his head inside the 
first crater where he bled extensively, probably from a severed carotid artery. 
 
DETAILED ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES ON DAY OF ACCIDENT 
The Board of Inquiry noted that almost no one, from senior managers to deminers at 
[Demining group] was in possession of a wristwatch. Some deminers said they relied on their 
mobile telephones for the time, but as mobile phones are not allowed onto the work site, this 
seems unsatisfactory. 
Activities on the night before the accident followed a normal routine pattern and after eating 
dinner at between seven o’clock and eight o’clock, team members, including [the Victim], 
watched a DVD movie on the camp portable television and then went to their beds between 
nine o’clock and ten-thirty, the same time as usual.  
No evidence was found that any person at this task site was suffering from illness or sickness 
or had any reason to behave in any way that would be considered as particularly unusual or 
out of the ordinary. No alcohol or drugs are permitted on the task site area and deminers are 
forbidden to consume alcohol during their tours of duty on operational tasks. 
On the day of the accident, team members awoke and arose, as usual, at between four and 
four-thirty in the morning. After morning prayers, for the more devout members of the team, 
breakfast of bread and tea was taken by all and, after time to visit the latrine and ablutions, a 
routine morning safety briefing was delivered by the Team Leader and all team members 
were at work in the minefield by 05:15hrs. 
During questioning of the team, the Board of Inquiry attempted to find out what subjects the 
Team Leader had briefed the deminers about during his morning safety briefing. But answers 
were inaccurate, inconsistent and/or contradicted each other or were not concomitant with 
known facts or observations. When pressed on this subject, some deminers stated that the 
briefing had covered ‘safety’, but were unable to further elucidate about exactly which safety 
subjects they had been briefed upon. Other deminers agreed with every subject suggested by 
interviewers. E.g., were you briefed about Metal detectors? – Yes. Working distances? – Yes. 
Casevac drills? – Yes. Use of [Demining group] vehicles? – Yes. PMN mines? – Yes. 
Excavation drills? – Yes. Minefield Survey? – Yes. Etc. 
For the following reasons, the day of the accident, 27 June 2007 was not a normal working 
day.  
1. It was a national holiday, the Day of National Unity for Tajikistan.  
2. A demolition of 130 PMN antipersonnel mines had been carried out on the day before 
and the fragments and debris left behind after the detonation had to be cleared up on this 
day.  
3. A visit was expected by a delegation of OSCE VIPs to the site. OSCE is [Demining 
group]’s major donor in Tajikistan, so this was an important visit. 
12 
4. A demolition of 71 PMN antipersonnel mines, which had been found within the same 
minefield, but on the other side of the ammunition depot, were to be destroyed by 
explosive demolition on that day. 
For these reasons, the Team Leader did not personally deploy to the work site on the day of 
the accident. Instead, he was involved in the preparation for the visit and the demolition of the 
PMN mines on the other side of the depot. 
The members of Section One were deployed, without direct supervision, to the area where 
the demolition had been carried out on the day before. The Section Leader followed a few 
minutes later. 
The line of mine clearance was along an axis which followed the line of the barbed wire fence, 
which enclosed the minefield in a southeast to northwest direction of progress, on this side of 
the minefield, following along the line of the rows of landmines laid in the ground. 
Each deminer was separated from his nearest co-worker by a distance of approximately 
twenty-five metres, as shown in the diagram below. Each deminer was responsible for the 
clearance of the ground between his own position and the position where the next deminer 
was working in front of him. 
 
[The Victim] deployed to the middle part of this line of workers, with three deminers in front of 
him, each spaced at twenty-five metre intervals apart from the next, and three deminers 
behind him at similar spacing. 
Because no other untoward events have been reported, the assumption must be that [the 
Victim] started work and carried out his duties of searching for debris and fragments of 
destroyed landmines. He was working along the clearance lane towards a north westerly 
direction and had with him approved tools and equipment, in accordance with normal working 
practices and [Demining group]’s published [outdated] Standing Operational Procedures. 
Although he was not formally tasked or shown where to work and there are no direct 
witnesses who saw exactly what [the Victim] did on that day, it seems likely that the 
procedures of his work prior to the accident were not fully in accordance with normal working 
practices and [Demining group]’s published Standing Operational Procedures because some 
aspects of the work he was doing (clearing debris and fragmentation from a demolition shot 
inside a minefield) is not regulated by [Demining group]’s SOP. 
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He was working in a confusing place, where the marking system was not entirely clear. 
Organisation, effectiveness and accuracy of site marking observed by the Board of Inquiry at 
the site on the day of the accident was questionable and may have contributed to his 
confusion. 
During interviews at the task site after the accident, there was no general agreement between 
the members of number One Section on several issues. They seemed unsure, but it seems 
that the team had been told one of three things. This was either to: 
a) Using a general sweep with metal detectors, hand-held magnets and visual 
observations, search for and remove debris and fragmentation, left behind after the 
previous day’s demolition of PMNs. 
b) Clear lanes whilst searching for landmines, in the same manner as they had been 
used to doing on most other working days. 
c) A combination of both points a and b. 
[The Victim] and all other members of the team at work that day continued working until 
06:00hrs, at which time they took a scheduled routine break to rest and drink water. They 
rested for fifteen minutes and were back at work in the minefield at 06:15hrs. 
Section Leader [Name removed] states that he supervised Deminer Number One from a few 
minutes after 05:15hrs up to the time the team stopped work for their routine rest break, at 
05:45. At 06:00hrs, after the break, he supervised Deminer Number Two, for approximately 
thirty minutes and then started to move towards Deminer Number Three. At that time, the 
unplanned detonations which killed [the Victim] (Deminer Number Four) occurred.  
No one knows what actions were carried out in the minefield by [the Victim] that morning 
because he worked unobserved, unsupervised and alone. Informed conjecture based upon 
observations at the site and interviews with team members, supervisors and managers 
suggests that this is what happened: 
a) Up to the time of the rest break and on return to the works area, [the Victim] worked 
the same as everyone else, clearing up pieces of fragmentation and debris from the 
previous day’s demolitions task, when 130 PMN antipersonnel mines had been 
destroyed in situ by explosive demolition. 
b) At approximately 06:15hrs [the Victim] went back to work in the clearance lane he 
had marked with his base-stick and the marking tapes which were attached to it. 
c) Either he stepped over his base-stick, out of the cleared area and into the uncleared 
area. His first step was onto the first of the two PMN landmines which eventually 
killed him. 
d) Or he was either crouching or kneeling down on one knee, possibly about to drive a 
wooden marker picket into the ground, using the hammer which was issued to him as 
part of his tool kit for such tasks. The pressure of his foot caused the detonation of 
the first PMN landmine. 
e) During the explosive blast caused by the detonation of the first PMN landmine, [the 
Victim] was thrown forwards and his visor struck the ground in front of him. Maybe he 
was wearing the visor at this time, maybe he was not, but the visor shows undeniable 
evidence of being in very close proximity with heat such as that associated with an 
explosive detonation. 
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f) A large part of the visor became a very fast moving projectile and cut through [the 
Victim]’s neck at extremely high speed. This injury quickly caused the loss of a 
considerable amount of blood from the front and right side of [the Victim]’s neck. 
Note: The kinetic energy and heat that is released during the combustion of the explosive 
affects the surrounding area as follows: 
• Blast effects 
• Effects of air displacement waves (direct and reflected) 
• Ground shock 
• Effects of fireball and heat radiation 
• Fragmentation originating from the casing of the mine 
• Secondary fragmentation from the foundation and surroundings. 
The direct and reflected blast and effects of air displacement created by the detonation shock 
wave of the second PMN caused [the Victim]’s Personal Protective Equipment apron to be 
torn entirely from his body and it was later recovered 12 metres from the point of detonation. 
For distances at which other items of Personal Protective Equipment were found, see sketch 
at Annex O. 
 
SUMMARY 
[The Victim] was part of an [Demining group] Mine Clearance Team was clearing an area of 
ground that they knew was definitely mined with PMN anti-personnel mines, laid very close 
together, at intervals of less than one metre between one mine and the next. The day was not 
a normal working day but nothing untoward had happened during the previous twenty-four 
hours that might affect operations at the site. [The Victim] was working unsupervised in the 
middle part of the site; the drills and procedures he was using were probably not in 
accordance with SOP and the site was inadequately marked. 
Injuries sustained by [The Victim] and damage to his PPE, as well as evidence from the 
craters and surrounding area indicate very clearly he was killed by two PMN landmines. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Field control inadequacy. There was weakness in command and control, probably 
because the Team Leader was not on site. The Section Leader had not personally 
deployed each deminer specifically and individually.  
2. Management inadequacy. [Demining group] Dushanbe’s interpersonal 
communications and briefings as well as their administration and organization were 
not fully effective. During interviews there was no consensus from team members 
about a number of issues. The demining team members did not know if it was a 
holiday or not and were not fully briefed about the work they were expected to do. 
Although [Demining group] state that many unrecorded visits had been made to the 
task site by managers and supervisors, these were not recorded in the site logbook. 
3. Although there was no deliberate or demonstrable neglect, carelessness or 
misconduct by any of the personnel involved, the deminer killed in this incident was 
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not supervised correctly and it is likely that he was unsure of what he was supposed 
to be doing and was further unsure about where he was supposed to be doing it. 
4. Procedures and drills used on this site are not regulated by or articulated in Standing 
Operational Procedures and therefore are subject to local interpretation or even 
disregard. Although [Demining group] Dushanbe issued an Implementation Plan, 
more detailed descriptions of drills and procedures are required in the document.  
5. Personnel were given unclear or inappropriate briefing by supervisory staff. Deminers 
were unsure whether it was a working day or a holiday and were not certain about 
what work they should have been doing. 
6. Because the area was inadequately marked, there is a strong possibility that [the 
Victim] was confused about exactly where he was in terms of safe/unsafe and 
clear/cleared/uncleared areas. 
7. [Demining group]’s administration after a demining accident was unsatisfactory. 
Requested documentation provided to the Board of Inquiry team by [Demining group] 
Dushanbe was delayed, undelivered, confused and disorganized, though this 
situation improved towards the finalisation of the inquiry, when requests from the 
Board of Inquiry to [Demining group] were dealt with well. 
• Timeline was very disorganised. Originally stated that casualty was 
‘stabilized’ by medic; casualty was dead. See Annex P for updated and 
corrected Timeline. [Not included.] 
• Team nominal roll and organigram were both inaccurate, showed two 
personnel ID numbers as the same and showed team appointments 
incorrectly. 
• Training programmes requested by the board were incomplete. 
• QA/QC monitoring records were not received by the board. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. All members of the team involved in this accident should undergo at least three eight-
hour days of refresher training and psychological counselling before being re-
deployed to any demining task. 
2. More national managers should be trained, mentored and deployed to inspect mine 
action task sites and to manage and supervise teams in the field, particularly in 
places where expatriate staff members are not available. 
3. The team’s ambulance should have been closer to the task site. A negotiation should 
be made with the Border Force to allow the ambulance to be brought inside the 
ammunition storage compound whenever necessary and the ambulance should be 
moved as close as possible to whichever part of the site it is meant to be supporting. 
4. On site briefings need to be improved; Deminers don’t listen and/or can’t remember 
routine briefings. Briefings should be graphic; use of models, maps and other training 
aids should be considered. Interpersonal communications between Dushanbe HQ 
and field operations should also be improved, so that when decisions are made, it is 
clear who has made them. 
5. [Demining group] should provide wrist watches to staff members or encourage 
employees to buy their own. 
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6. After any demolition of landmines on the minefield, the area should be properly re-
marked, under the supervision of the Team Leader, Section Leaders and the 
demolitions supervisor.  
7. Procedures for supervisors’ observation and supervision of leading deminers should 
be improved. Deminers in particularly difficult or exposed areas should be the subject 
of closer observation and support from their supervisors.  
8. Team Leaders should deploy to the works area together with their teams and should 
remain in the minefield whenever their team members are at work.  
9. If preparations are to be made for VIP visits, either on-site works should be halted, or 
[Demining group] HQ Dushanbe should manage the situation to ensure that deminers 
do not work unsupervised by their Team Leader.  
10. Supervisors should ensure that marking is checked before the start of each day’s 
work to ensure that all areas are clearly identified.  
11. Deminers should always be deployed to the start point of their daily work by a 
supervisor. 
12. Marking between cleared and uncleared areas should be improved. This is 
particularly important in areas where long lines of antipersonnel mines are being 
cleared by hand and multiple detonations of mines has occurred; it is difficult for 
deminers to see exactly where the end of the demolitions shot(s) finish and the 
uncleared mines lay. Demolitions supervisors should be fully aware of exactly how 
many detonations have occurred after every shot and how many detonators or 
charges have failed. The only way to be quite certain of this is to physically visit each 
crater to inspect whether the charge detonated as planned; therefore demolitions 
supervisors should count craters immediately after any demolitions task is completed 
and mark the end point of the tasking. In the case of Kirgochak minefield, where there 
is almost no vegetation and the mine rows are only a few metres from the barbed 
wire perimeter fence, this procedure can be carried out easily and without entering 
the dangerous or uncleared area. 
13. [Demining group] should train personnel to be able to deal with the administration 
required after an accident. E.g. Timeline should have been started by a nominated 
person on site immediately the unplanned detonation took place and this should be 
practised as part of CASEVAC drills.  
14. As recommended in the Board of Inquiry report for the [Demining group] accident 
which occurred on 19 April 2006, and again for the Board of inquiry report for the 
[Demining group] accident which occurred on 21 August 2006, the Board of Inquiry 
recommends once again that, in order to better reflect good practices and recent 
developments in mine action, [Demining group] Standing Operational Procedures 
should be reviewed and updated urgently. As [Demining group] have not responded 
twice before to this same recommendation, we further recommend that TMAC 
requires [Demining group] to provide an updated and complete SOP by 30 August 
2007. 
 
SIGNED: UNDP Project Manager, BOMBAF; Chief of Engineering, Ministry of Defence; 
Operations Officer, TMAC. 
[All original Annex and support documents are held on file.] 
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Victim Report 
Victim number: 628 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 22 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 45 minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
severe Abdomen 
severe Chest 
severe Face 
severe Genitals 
severe Head 
severe Leg 
severe Neck 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg Below knee 
FATAL 
COMMENT: See Medical report 
 
Medical report 
 
  
Throat injury 
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 All lower body injuries. 
 Remains of foot 
 Upper inner thigh and genital injury. 
Demining group initial medical report: 
Loss of left foot; extensive damage to leg up to genital area; loss of testes; minor damage to 
right leg; blast injury to inner left forearm; blast burns to chest; partial decapitation including 
severing  of both arteries. 
Evacuation to known safe area; attempted to induce breathing and heartbeat, wounds bound, 
intravenous drip administered; transportation to Russian military hospital. Declared DOA. 
Departure Time: 06:43 Kirgochak 
ETA: 07:38 Russian Military Hospital 
 
Initial Post-Mortem Examination Report [Translated from Russian] 
Ministry of Health of Republic of Tajikistan    
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Republican Centre of court medical inspection  
30 June, 2007 
Diagnosis: Explosion trauma. Neck - injury of blood vessels and nerves, throat, gullet. Open 
fracture of the lower left jaw.  Closed fracture of the left shin. Large fracture of trauma of 
external and internal surface of hip, covering top …., eggs. Not complete amputation of the 
bones of a foot, open fragmentation fracture of the bones of a foot, nail bones I-II-III. 
Fragmentation injuries in chest and stomach.  Serious bleeding.  
[Name removed], Expert of Court medical inspection. 
 
Medical examination report 2nd July 2007 
Fundamental illness: explosive trauma: Avulsed (lacerated) wound of neck with damage of 
neurovascular fascicles, pharynx, larynx, esophagus, soft tissues of neck. Open (compound) 
fracture of lower jaw from left side with displacement of bone (fracture) fragments. Simple 
comminuted [Splintered] fracture of left shin with displacement of bone (fracture) fragments. 
Extensive avulsed [lacerated] wound of external and internal surface of thigh, starting with 
upper third with transfer of lower third left thigh, perineum of testicle. Incomplete amputation 
of foot bone, comminuted [splintered] fracture of foot bones and I-II-III foot phalanx. Non 
penetrating fragmentation blunt [non perforating] wound of thorax and abdomen. 
Complication acute loss of blood. 
No concomitant. 
Medical Examiner. 
 
Related papers 
 
Damage to PPE and boot 
 
The bottom of the visor is closest to the camera, heat bubbling and distortion is evident. The 
top of the visor is missing. Fragments of the head-frame material were found in the second 
crater. 
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Twisted spike at bottom of visor which injured the Victim’s throat as it was torn aside. 
  
The Victim’s PPE showing blast damage down the left side and straps torn off. 
 
 The victim’s left boot. 
 
Analysis 
This accident is classed as a “Missed mine” accident because the Victim almost certainly 
believed that he was stepping in a cleared area. Whether it had been “cleared” or not cannot 
be known because the group did not use internal minefield marking at the site 
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Unusually, both the primary and secondary causes of this accident are listed as “Management 
control inadequacies” because the demining group’s management had not taken note of the 
lessons of previous accidents and updated their SOPs.  The Victim had no clear instructions, 
no supervision and the demining group National management was not even aware that the 
group was working that day despite the fact that the international staff planned to visit the site 
with donors later that day. There was no adequate marking inside the mined area and 
marking placed after the event was both inadequate and an attempt to mislead the 
investigators. The lack of internal minefield marking means that the Victim almost certainly 
moved out of the area where the detonations had taken place without realising that he was 
doing so. 
A further management failing was the fact that the International Director of the demining 
group agreed with the findings of the Board of Inquiry and gave his personal word that the 
failings would be corrected immediately: adequate SOPs and working practices were still not 
in place five months later when the next accident at the site occurred. 
From the injuries sustained, it is likely that the Victim was reaching forward to collect a piece 
of debris from the previous demolition when the accident occurred. The first mine pitched him 
forward and his head landed inside the visor on top of the second mine. The visor was 
vaporised near the top, flattened near the middle, and split on the bottom where it did not get 
hot enough to distort. The split visor then cut the victim’s throat. The autopsy did not include 
x-raying the corpse, but it is very likely that the Victim’s neck was broken by the shock of the 
second blast. He was thrown back and bled to death rapidly with his head in the crater of the 
mine he had stepped on. It is unlikely that he would have died from the injuries sustained in 
the first detonation.    
The detailed accident report was conducted with great speed that did not allow it to include 
translation of the witness statements. The originals and all background information were 
made available and are held on file. The BoI report and associated documents and pictures 
constitute the best (most complete) investigation in the DDAS record. 
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